Abstract-This paper uses a detailed empirical process study to explore the mechanisms that drive complex hierarchically integrated technologies to regress in apparent maturity ("switchback") over the course of their innovation pathways. Three mechanisms are identified that explain the underlying behavior: switchbacks occur 1) as a natural discovery dynamic, the result of mid-pathway efforts to fill gaps revealed through systems integration; 2) as a strategic framing used by technologists to survive funding shortfalls; or 3) as a revisit of known problems in response to uncertainty in a discrete mission opportunity environment. Although switchbacks are traditionally thought of as deviant events that should be suppressed by managers, this study reveals that many "switchbacks" represent a natural, and necessary, part of the complex technology development process. The implications of these findings are demonstrated by analyzing one dominant funding decision heuristic in terms of the assumptions it embodies and its consistency with the above-described mechanisms. The analysis reveals that efforts to eliminate switchbacks may stifle important innovations without necessarily improving efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION

S
USTAINED innovative performance requires investment in both exploration (of new concepts) and exploitation (to improve existing products) [1] - [3] . Technology managers play a critical role in balancing exploration and exploitation, deciding the relative resource allocation among different funding "buckets" and setting the criteria for choosing which technologies to promote from one stage to the next. Yet, despite a substantial literature examining the portfolio problem [4] - [7] and the processes of innovation [8] - [10] , infusion [11] , [12] , and diffusion [13] , there remains a growing disconnect between theoretical developments and practical advice [14] .
This disconnect is particularly pronounced in the domain of architecturally complex hierarchical systems, where new capabilities may be infused at multiple levels of the system within a single product cycle [15] . For example, a new satellite might incorporate both a new solar array (subsystem) and new detector architecture (component) in the same development cycle. These two types of innovations require very different investment profiles, levels of coordination, and infusion timelines. Yet, current models and management processes are not nuanced enough to distinguish between changes of different kinds, at different levels of the system. As a result, in practice, first-line funding managers handle this misalignment through informal, undocumented means, hiding the true innovation dynamics. As system complexity increases, this type of multilevel multiple time-scale technical innovation is becoming an increasingly important determinant of project and product performance [14] , [16] . It is important to better document, and explain, these internal technical dynamics, so they can be actively considered and managed. This paper explores these technical dynamics and informal managerial processes, unpacking the nature of the mismatch between the process of innovation "as designed" versus "as implemented" in complex system development processes. It does this through a detailed empirical study of NASA's innovation ecosystem. This study illustrates that not only our current understanding of the process is incomplete, more importantly, management heuristics developed based on current models can suppress certain dynamics that are critical to the complex system innovation process. Where current management structures (e.g., stage-gate processes [17] , technology readiness levels (TRL) [18] ) assume a monotonic progression in maturity over time, multiple instances of apparent regressions in maturity ("switchbacks") to earlier stages/levels were observed in each of the pathways studied [19] . Although "switchbacks" are traditionally thought of as deviant events that should be suppressed by managers, 1 this study reveals that many "switchbacks" represent a natural, and necessary, part of the complex technology development process. Efforts to eliminate them may stifle important innovations without necessarily improving efficiency.
To improve current conceptualizations of the process, three underlying mechanisms were identified that collectively explain all the instances of "switchbacks" observed in this study. Namely, switchbacks manifest through the following mechanisms: 1) as a natural discovery dynamic, the result of midpathway efforts to fill gaps revealed through systems integration; 2) as a strategic framing used by technologists to survive funding shortfalls; or (3) as a revisit of known, productive, problems in response to uncertainty in a discrete mission opportunity environment. While mechanism #2 may be construed as a "deviant" action under some circumstances, #1 and #3 are not "deviant" by any standard.
Understanding why switchbacks occur has both theoretical and practical value. Theoretically, the contribution is the way these explanatory mechanisms add nuance to the discussion of nonlinearity in innovation processes. Where extant theory explains the observed nonlinearities in innovation processes in terms of either "nonbasic" sources of innovation [8] , [10] , or interdependencies among elements of the capability-market chain [20] , [21] , the mechanisms described in this paper provide an explanation that is endogenous to the technical evolution itself. By looking at the coevolution of parts of a complex system separately, the switchback mechanisms explain the nonlinearity in a way that is connected to way that managers manage.
From a practical perspective, the contribution is in understanding that switchbacks are not evidence of deviance that should be suppressed, and why they occur, provides a basis for improved technology management. Detailed empirical evidence illustrates how misaligned mental models on the part of managers can unintentionally suppress critical innovation dynamics. To reinforce the importance of aligning mental models of the process with the actual underlying dynamics, one dominant funding decision heuristic is dissected in terms of the assumptions it embodies and its consistency with the above described mechanisms. The broader implications of disconnects of this type are discussed. While the empirical evidence presented is limited to space science technologies developed at NASA, we believe that the mechanisms apply beyond this context. They describe the dynamics of any complex product development, conducted by a highly trained workforce that is given some level of task discretion and should, therefore, apply to other research settings that develop physical products. This paper is organized in five sections. Section II describes the relevant theoretical background. Section III discusses the methodology used to identify the mechanisms. Section IV explains the mechanisms and describes the supporting evidence. Section V discusses implications for systems engineering and management, and Section VI concludes this paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND THEORY
Innovation is widely recognized as an important driver of economic growth and a necessity for sustained technology competitiveness [3] , [22] . Over the years, significant scholarly attention has been devoted to both understanding the process through which the phenomenon occurs [see [23] , [24] for comprehensive reviews] and developing tools that support the management of that process (e.g., methods for evaluating projects and portfolios [25] ) and for structuring the stages in the process [17] ). However, less attention has been given to the informal role that technical first-line managers play in shaping the ecosystem and the levels at which change occurs within the new technical system. This section begins by summarizing the evolution of dominant theories of the process of innovation. It briefly reviews the role that tools play in "managing" innovation and then motivates the role that managers, through their discretion, can and do play in the process.
A. Theoretical Models of the Process of Innovation
Most studies trace the first instantiation of a model of the innovation process to Vannevar Bush's 1945 policy report "Science: The Endless Frontier" [26] . The report argued for government funding of basic research, citing a causal relationship between scientific discovery and the future applied outcomes that research would enable [8] . This linear notion of innovation synthesized ideas tracing as far back as Greek philosophy [27] and proved a powerful tool in the quest for funding and infrastructure for scientific research, leading to, among other things, the creation of the National Science Foundation (NSF). However, Bush's report was neither empirical nor theoretically fleshed out [8] ; it was after all written as a policy instrument. In the years since its release, three generations of conceptual paradigms have been elaborated. This section is structured around these paradigms: the linear model, interlinked models, and systems models.
1) Linear Model:
The so-called linear model of innovation embodies the notion that basic scientific discovery precedes applied research, which in turn precedes application in a marketplace. The stages are linked in a causal sequence [8] . Within academic circles, the linear model has taken on two main forms: push and pull. Though the "push" model has never been widely popular as a theoretical explanation, it gained some level of acceptance during the postwar 1950s and 1960s, when its simplistic representation fit the observation fairly well. Following the Second World War, western economies enjoyed a period of seemingly boundless growth. While industrial expansion and economic growth seemed unbounded, the dominant theory was one of the technology push: innovation begins with discovery, followed by development, manufacturing, and ending with sales [23] . The emphasis was strongly on the supply side and implicitly assumed that the market would desire any new product that was developed [28] . Thinking on the direction of the linear progression shifted in the late 1960s when the postwar demand imbalance equilibrated, forcing a more targeted approach to product development [29] . The market pull theory provided an alternative explanation, describing a progression that begins with a need. That need drives business strategy, which targets research that creates new capabilities, which are developed into a new product that finally fills the identified niche [23] . Despite broad-based scholarly rejection of the linear model, LM-based tools remain a staple of technology management practice.
2) Interlinked Model: Interlinked models, also known as chain-linked [10] or coupled/cyclical models of innovation [1] , tend to maintain the functionally separable phases of the linear model, but acknowledge multidirectional flows of both needs and capabilities. They allow for both needs and capabilities to evolve over time, continuously interacting with the functional elements of the process of innovation. These models grew out of a deeply empirical stream of research (cf., [1] , [30] , [31] ), inspired in the 1970s by a severely resource constrained economy [23] . Contrary to the simple linear view, these studies, and the ones that followed, illustrated that the process of innovation was much more complex than had previously been thought. The distinction between stages (e.g., basic and applied research) is not clear-cut in practice [32] - [34] . Nor is science the only source of new capabilities [10] , [35] ; in some sectors, it is not even the primary source. Although the interlinked view is conceptually quite different from a rigid interpretation of the linear model, it maintains most of the same elements [8] . As a result, it has not had a significantly different impact on national policy compared to the linear model.
3) Systems of Innovation: Since the 1990s, a significant portion of innovation research has shifted from a focus on defining the stages of the process and their interconnections to an examination of the institutions and actors in the broader ecosystem. There are three main models that have emerged in this context, which we broadly refer to as systems of innovation: national systems [36] , Mode 2 [20] , and the Triple Helix [37] . They all share the common thread of focusing on the multidirectional interactions among actors in an ecosystem. They view the capacity of a firm to innovate as a function of its interactions with outside entities (other firms and governments, but also nontraditional entities) as well as the infrastructure available to transfer that knowledge (e.g., financial institutions, law, and policy) [8] . This rethinking of the problem is responsible for some policy changes associated with the development of regional innovation clusters. Yet, while the systems view is currently accepted (within academic circles) as the most realistic model of the innovation process, many policy-makers continue to rely on derivatives of the linear model because of its direct link to the "buckets" familiar to decision-makers [8] , [38] . Not surprisingly, system views have little impact on management within the firm.
B. Role of Tools in Managing the Innovation Process
While understanding the process of innovation is an important theoretical end in-and-of-itself, many of the above-described studies were also conducted with a view to informing policy, management practice or both. Policies, in this context, define relative investment in research versus mission-oriented agencies (e.g., Bush was advocating for the creation of NSF in [8] ) or how to structure tax incentives in particular locations (e.g., to encourage the formation of particular types of clusters). Management tools derived from these theories act at a lower level, and typically fall into two categories: imposing structure on the process (e.g., through defined decision gates [17] or criteria associated with maturity levels [18] ), or informing portfolio analysis and planning at the executive office-level.
1) Process Structuring Tools:
The linear model underlies the majority of modern process and tracking tools. The StageGate model [17] is widely used to manage technical progress across multiple engineering and government organizations [cf., [39] , [40] ]. It resolves technology progress into a series of sequential stages separated by decision gates. The progression is from early stage concepts to infusion in a product line or operational system. In some organizations, technology development and project development are explicitly separated. In others, they are not [41] . Gates are intended to control the flow of new concepts, nominally in decreasing numbers as maturity increases. Within NASA, the mission development process is conceptualized as a stage-gate process with seven stages, six key decision points, and multiple formal reviews [39] . New technologies are nominally matured outside of this formal process and tracked using TRL. TRL is a scale from 1 to 9, where 1 is a basic principle demonstrated in the lab and 9 is a proven system that has been launched into space (e.g., [18] ). Depending on the maturity (TRL) of the technology, it is eligible for different categories of R&D funding within the agency. Combined, these process tools define a structured path through which new technologies and mission concepts are matured.
2) Resource Allocating Tools: Substantial effort has been invested in developing methods for optimally allocating fixed resources across the range of technologies and buckets within a defined process (see [4] for a recent review). The tools range from qualitative, to quasi-quantitative, to optimization methods focused on single projects and portfolios of projects [5] [7] . Qualitative methods tend to rely on the expertise of the evaluator(s) and their ability to value nonquantifiable attributes of the concept and the proposer. They work well when a small number of projects can be compared directly but tend to be difficult to defend and do not scale well in large organizations. Semiquantitative methods add structure to the expert review process by focusing evaluation on particular predefined attributes. They are more defensible than purely qualitative methods but still struggle when scaled and are only as good as the criteria defined. A wide range of quantitative methods have been developed, ranging from real-options analyses, pure cash flow measures, and a range of optimization techniques. These methods are exactly as good as the quanitifiability of the data that feeds them; often, in complex organizations, it is infeasible to define relevant uncertainties, interdependencies and link investment to any reasonable measure of return on investment [42] .
C. Role of Managers in Managing the Innovation Process
Although the act of innovating is usually thought of as being performed by scientists and engineers working in a technical capacity, managers, at multiple levels of an organization, play a critical role in enabling the process. At the level of top management, the design of the organization contributes to the quality and frequency of interactions among contributing disciplines [43] ; it also imposes a particular decomposition of the technical work, which defines interfaces among modules, emphasizing within-module challenges, and hiding across-module opportunities [44] , [45] . As noted above, executive level technology offices play a role in defining priorities and allocating resources to support those goals. Sophisticated portfolio optimization tools have been developed to support this process (discussed above); however, the extent of their data needs make them impractical for complex integrated systems and large multiproduct organizations [46] . As a result, more qualitative tools, like scoring and peer-review, are the norm [42] . First-line managers, who are embedded in the technical divisions of the organization, typically administer these substantial funds. In fact, in an organization like NASA, level-2 and level-3 offices, distributed among the field centers, 2 administe a majority of nonmission research funds. As a result, the formal processes and modeling approaches that have been studied extensively only explain structural parts of a NASA-like agency's innovation system. Many of the dynamics are governed by the way that first-line managers interpret their roles and communicate their preferences [47] . The informal system can have an enormous impact on how technologies evolve; yet this is the aspect we understand least. To that end, this study focuses on the interaction of natural technology evolutionary dynamics and the role of first-line managers in enabling the process as a basis for improved technology management.
III. RESEARCH APPROACH
Stated more formally, this research has two objectives: 1) unpack the mechanisms that drive technology pathways to diverge from their expected development paths; and 2) evaluate the fit between prevalent management heuristics and the observed dynamics. To accomplish this, the research was performed in six steps. First, a set of representative cases of technology development was identified. Second, the path taken by each technology as it was matured from the concept to flight was traced. Third, all instances of deviations from the nominal development path were identified from the process histories. Fourth, the instances were iteratively cross-compared to identify common underlying mechanisms. Fifth, the impacts of the mechanisms were assessed for consistency with current management heuristics in this particular context. The sections that follow describe each step.
A. Case Selection
Innovations in space science instruments were chosen as the research context for this study for several reasons. First, science spacecraft are complex technical systems that enjoy between-generation improvements at multiple architectural levels, thereby providing multiple opportunities to observe "switchbacks." Second, the monopsony nature of the space science sector ensures a relatively self-contained, well-documented innovation ecosystem. This enables a level of completeness in data collection that would not be possible in other sectors. Third, the author had previously compiled a set of detailed comparable process histories that can be leveraged for this work. The six technologies (heretofore referred to as TechA to TechF) were down-selected from an enumerated list of all innovations meeting the criteria of being science-enabling instrument technologies and infused within the last decade on a range of explorer and flagship missions. The specific technologies include several major detector innovations (e.g., employing a new material, or changing the measurement paradigm), cryogenic subsystems, and self-contained detector systems. The units of innovation were defined by the innovators and, as a result, are not necessarily consistent in their level of interaction with the spacecraft system. At the time when the technologies were selected for study, it was not known which ones would be successfully flown, though all of them were at least baselined on a mission of record. The technologies were all developed at NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center. They include sensors and instrument subsystems spanning infrared to gamma ray wavebands. This sample is representative of Goddard's space science ecosystem.
B. Process Tracing and Data
The data for this study was collected over a two-year period ending in 2011, on location at the Goddard Space Flight Center. The interview and archival data were used to construct detailed process histories [48] for each pathway. These pathways then formed the basis of subsequent analysis as described below.
In depth, semistructured interviews were conducted with each of the scientists, engineers, and managers involved in the particular innovation pathway. Interviews lasted from 30 min to 4 h and covered the respondents' involvement with each element of the process, including motivations for particular actions. In total, more than 100 h of interviews were conducted. The interviews were used for two purposes. First, a subset of initial interview accounts served to create a sketch of the critical events, helping to focus the document search that followed. Primary records, like contract documents were then used to validate the details of the timeline, since decade-old memories can be fallible. The second round of interviews was then used to probe the motivations of the actors and understand why particular pathways were taken at different times. In all, more than 250 documents supplemented the interviews. The documents ranged from journal articles to grant proposals and technical memos.
For each pathway, the process data were analyzed in multiple iterative stages [48, ] [50] . First, an analytical chronology was constructed for each case and validated by key informants. These chronologies aimed to clarify sequences across levels of analysis and develop initial themes [51] , which were then coded, and abstracted, more systematically using what Langley calls visual mapping [48] . This approach provided a structured basis to triangulate key process steps and also to obtain a real-time view of the teams' understanding of key technical challenges and contextual motivations [48] , [49] . Once the process histories had been compiled in Step 2, each history was plotted over time, in terms of the self-reported maturity (usually TRL) in the sequence of funding proposals. While this is an imperfect measure of real maturity (cf., [52] ), it is the main measurement currently evaluated in practice and, therefore, appropriate for our comparison of "as designed" to "as implemented." When the temporal progression is plotted in this way, instances of switchbacks can be identified by inspection.
C. Identifying Instances of Switchbacks
Across the six cases, 15 instances of switchbacks were observed, with at least one instance in every case. Fig. 1 captures The history associated with each instance is summarized in Table I in terms of the surrounding context, the history directly pertaining to the instance and the mechanism at play. This method of capturing the complete innovation pathway before isolating instances of switchbacks is thought to reduce the likelihood of ignoring key contextual variables [48] and of focusing only on proximate causes of the switchback.
D. Theory Building: Cross Comparison of Instances
The theoretical explanations were built following the approach outlined by Eisenhardt [53] , iterating between data and emerging theory. The analysis began by synthesizing the event sequences surrounding each of the observed switchbacks. These events were coded in terms of their dominant drivers, beginning with the first two pathways (TechA and TechB). The emergent explanations were then tested on the subsequent two pathways, and refined as necessary. Finally, the refined codes were tested on the remaining pathways. Since no new explanations were required, the standard of theoretical saturation was met [54] .
E. Linking Management Heuristics to Observed Dynamics
In addition to capturing the history of the technical evolution, the interviews and document review provided insight into how each actor viewed the decisions they faced. For example, one funding manger explained that during proposal reviews, someone would inevitably notice if a particular proposer has an idea that seems a bit too similar to last year's. He went on to explain how "IRAD" (the particular funding mechanism) was not designed to support multiple years of work; it was supposed to seed applications for funding at the headquarters level. These statements reveal how this respondent views his role in the system: He makes a decision about early stage funding and that funding is only supposed to be used early on in a pathway. And, since reviews are not double blind, factors outside what's written in the proposal can play a role.
By aggregating all statements of this kind, several common heuristics were identified for how particular funding pots are managed in practice, and how proposers believe they are managed. Focusing on one particular funding decision, the multilevel perceptions were analyzed in terms of how they influenced the process. By the end of the sequence, the team had demonstrated a 1 K x 1 K array of hyperspectral detectors and integrated it with the corresponding readout electronics. The technology had been matured to the point where no new science still needed to be worked out; the remaining required investment would target space qualification and engineering progress. Instance: However, without an immediate flight opportunity on the time struggled to find the resources required to continue their progress. An opportunity for continued funding presented itself when one of the core technologists and the CEO of a small business struck up a conversation at a domain specific technical conference. They discovered a common interest in developing TechA-based cameras and worked out the rough idea for an SBIR proposal. The proposed concept represented a new architectural approach to the same functional capability. An SBIR was awarded in 2006, with the Goddard technologist serving as the Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR). Mechanism: The decision to reinvigorate the project with a nominal return to basic research was largely strategic. Had the team had an opportunity to continue their ESTO momentum and fly the instrument on a flight mission immediately, it would have been their preference. However, faced with limited options, and a strong desire to keep the project alive, they found a way to navigate the system. The external company had a new-to-NASA approach that was worth exploring. Had there been a way to begin with an SBIR Phase II, that might have been more appropriate; but there wasn't. So the approach was pitched as a novel architectural approach, merit of exploration. This short term funding served to keep the project moving, as intended.
Type 2: Strategic A2
A2: Simultaneous IRAD (early stage) and SBIR PII/ESTO (level-2) combination
Context: The output of the SBIR Phase I contract was a prototype TechA-based camera that leveraged the new architecture; an excellent result for the 6 month/100 K contracting mechanism. Despite the success, the Phase II bid was rejected for procedural reasons. The COTR believed the results spoke for themselves, and as a result, underestimated the importance of his advocacy role. The reviewers ranked the project in the bottom of the group. Instance: Fortunately the COTR was able to recover from this error. He made a series of phone calls to his colleagues in programmatic roles and was able to secure the equivalent of Phase II funding. The funding came from a partial SBIR Phase II and a partial ESTO grant, redistributed at the program officer's discretion. These two sources were supplemented with funding from Goddard's center-level discretionary fund (the program known as IRAD). The IRAD was framed to explore new fabrication techniques to support in-house TechA development. An effort that was complimentary to the planned development work. Mechanism: Having been rejected for the expected SBIR Phase II follow-on funding, the team scrambled to secure the resources required to keep moving forward. They applied for funding at multiple levels simultaneously carefully framed the requests to fit within the scope of the funding mechanism.
Type 2: Strategic B1 B1: DDF (early stage) and SR&T (level-2) after a Phase A mission study Context: By the mid-1990 s, scientists and engineers at Goddard had been collaborating on TechB-type detectors for several years. Having received funding from several center-and level-2 sources, they had made substantial progress on individual extremely fine resolution detectors. Based on this work, in 1995, the team won a Phase A study grant to work on pre-mission formulation for an upcoming opportunity. Although the technology was still quite immature by mission standards, given the uncertainty associated with when the next flight opportunity might arise, the team focused their efforts on integrating the best instrument they could. The concept was rejected due to serious concerns about technical feasibility. Instance: Without the focal point of mission readiness driving development decisions, the team returned to the research directions that had previously structured their inquiry (see B2). In addition, the act of integration served to identify some key areas that had not previously been a focus. Even after they solved all their material quality and deposition challenges, arraying and packaging would represent a serious challenge in-and-of-themselves. This discovery sparked a new collaboration and research effort targeted at arraying issues, funded by the Director's Discretionary Fund (DDF and predecessor to IRAD), a Phase II SBIR and SR&T (level-2) award. Mechanism: In this case, the act of integration revealed new component and integration challenges that merited the initiation of a second round of exploratory research.
Type 1: Discovery B2 B2: NDE (basic research) and SR&T after mission rejection Context: As noted above, the drive to be mission ready forced the team to drop a number of promising improvement paths. Instance: The rejected mission proposal freed them up to revisit these paths. One area of particular emphasis was in Non-destructive Evaluation (NDE) of material quality, a topic they had been struggling with from the beginning. They researched new techniques for material screening through collaboration with an NDE expert. Some of techniques have since become standard in the industry. Mechanism: Although the sequence is from mission bid to applied research (a switchback), it is not a regression. It is a return to what they should have been doing; a recovering from the premature mission-motivated progression.
Type 3: Revisit C1
C1: DDF after IPP (applied research)
Context: TechC is a dedicated instrument cooling subsystem, itself a complex system, composed of three main sub-components. The initiating insight in this case was that the incumbent single-shot system could be operated more efficiently if existing modules were recombined in sequence. TechC could then be operated in a temperature cascade, requiring less cooling-power per unit. Instance: This approach worked well in simulation, but when the first prototype was constructed, it became obvious that a fundamentally new component technology would be required at the interface. Where the interface heat switch had previously been operated passively (only being active when the system was being re-cycled), the new continuous mode required it to have an active function as well. Solving the problem required a basic-research activity at the component level. Mechanism: The act of prototyping the new subsystem revealed an unanticipated component-level challenge. To address it required a return to basic research at the component-level.
Type 1: Discovery C2
C2: IRAD after CETDP (level-2)
Context: Five years into the development of TechC, when the maturity was such that the team would have liked to start testing their multi-stage prototype, funding for crosscutting R&D (CETDP) was cut across the agency. Cooling is by definition a support capability. As a result, missions struggled to justify the risk of adopting a TRL 5 technology. At the time no future mission required the continuous capability; though it was recognized that the new system would be highly beneficial to many. Instance: Since there was no funding available to support the flight qualifying and testing TechC as they would have preferred, the team took the opportunity to conduct additional research on particular key components. While this work eventually proved valuable, it is unlikely that it would have been pursued, had there been funds to support system-level development. Mechanism: In order to maintain a steady stream of support, the team strategically scoped their efforts to contain basic research on key components. The motivation was to keep some level of activity funded, enough to keep the team together.
Type 2: Strategic C3 C3: IPP after CETDP Context: The team began exploring laboratory applications of the technology around the same time that CETDP funding was cut. Instance: It turned terrestrial science labs could benefit from the same improvements in cooling technology that had been developed for space applications. The motivation was mostly to keep core technicians busy on related work, but it also provided a tested for improving the thermal control schemes. This effort facilitated both component-level development, and research on a new architectural application of the core technology. Mechanism: As above, funding was secured to support exploration of a new application. The motivation was to keep key personnel busy, and the team alive. A third attempt at an X-ray spectroscopy mission was approved contingent on the inclusion of a redundant cooling system. TechC was the only available technology that could achieve this requirement. The mission didn't need a continuous system, but it did require a multi-stage temperature cascade (almost the full system). As a result, as part of mission development, the team was able to bring TechC to an effective TRL 6, a critical signal of maturity. Now future smaller missions will be able to adopt the new technology without being perceived to be taking on too much risk. Instance: The process of flight qualification has also served to identify some areas were additional research would be beneficial. In particular, operating continuously will pose a difficult thermal control challenge. This realization prompted an IRAD to examine the issue in detail -the source of the switchback in this instance. Mechanism: TechC is a concept that uses many pre-existing components in ways completely different than their original design. As a result, some of the required improvements weren't identified until a sufficiently realistic operating environment was constructed. Integration and operations was thus required to discover key component research paths. 
D2: IRAD after "Category 3" (mission-oriented)
Context: Three years into the TechD pathway, a mission opportunity arose. The opportunity was well timed to take advantage of a recent technical breakthrough. Although the breakthrough was more a proof-of-concept than a prototype, the capability was sufficiently novel to merit putting together a mission bid. The bid was rejected for mission status, but received "category 3" funding. A status reserved for potentially groundbreaking capabilities in need of time to buy-down mission risk. Instance: From a programmatic perspective, the plan was to spend two years maturing TechD in preparation for the next mission opportunity. However, from the perspective of the lead technologist, the extra time and funding presented an opportunity to continue experimenting with improved approaches. Rather than mature the existing architecture, he began investigating a new component-level approach. When funding ran out for system improvements, he sought IRAD funding to continue to explore the novel idea. Mechanism: Time pressure to be ready for an immanent mission call forced the team to act more mature than they believed they were. When the bid was rejected, they took the opportunity to revisit known open questions.
Type 3: Revisit D3 D3: APRA after "Category 3" Context: The category 3 funds ran out before the next mission call was released. Instance: Assuming that a next call would come out soon, the team looked for ways to keep the project moving. They wrote a series of Astronomy and Physics Research Activity (APRA) proposals to sustain themselves and found "day jobs" to free up resources to keep the project alive. Yet, by late 2005 the contractors were questioning the sanity of sticking with a project that couldn't pay them: "frankly, we though we were done. I was actively looking for a job, [the other contractor] had some job offers, but we decided to write two last proposals for the TPC stuff." Both were successful. Where the previous proposals had sought to continue the ongoing development work, the two successful proposals took a slightly different tact. They focused on researching new applications of the core capability. It was legitimately a different design and new application, but it was closely related enough to usefully push the concept forward. Mechanism: Faced with a funding shortfall, the team sought ways to secure enough resources to keep the project alive. They found success recasting the desired work as research on a new application of capability.
Type 2: Strategic E/F1 E/F1: DDF after years of NRA/Mission
This switchback is more a transition from one generation of technology to the next, than a switchback in the same pathway. A brief description is included for completeness, but it was not included in the inductive theory development. 13 years after the TechE concept was originally conceived, and following nearly that many years of flight-oriented technology development, the team was well aware of the limitations of the current architecture. When they became aware of an alternative temperature sensing approach (which would become TechF), they decided to explore the alternative architecture. This was done under a sequence of DDFs, in parallel with the continued TechE flight system development.
N/A/Type 1
E/F2 E/F2: DDF after Mission 1
Context: In 1999, 16 years after the initial TechE concept was conceived, it was launched as part of an X-ray spectroscopy instrument. However, the mission failed on launch, destroying the payload along with the satellite. A replacement mission was approved, providing an opportunity to revisit known limitations of the original system. Instance: During the early development, the process had been dominated by a need to make as much progress as possible to meet the ambitious timeline. At each stage, a wish list of additional work had been maintained in case there was a second opportunity. Now under the guise of a re-build, the team also pursued key component improvements. Mechanism: The strong pull of a flagship mission had forced the team to move on from key component pathways faster than they might have otherwise liked. The re-build offered an opportunity to revisit those previously identified avenues. 
IV. EXPLAINING SWITCHBACKS
This section presents an inductively developed explanation of why individual technologies appear to lose maturity during their progression from concept to flight. Full descriptions of the six innovation pathways can be found in [55] . For the sake of brevity, Table I summarize the relevant context and describes the sequence of events, actions and decisions that led up to, and immediately followed, each of the 15 switchback instances recorded in the study. The instances are grouped in terms of the technology pathway they are drawn from (per Fig. 1 ) and categorized in terms of the mechanism they embody.
All of the observed switchbacks can be explained in terms of the following three mechanisms. 1) Discovery: Switchbacks that occur as a natural part of the discovery process, associated with integrating complex systems. 2) Strategic: Switchbacks that result from a strategic framing used by technologists to survive funding shortfalls. 3) Revisit: Switchbacks that occur as a return to unfinished tasks when mission priorities change. Among the 15 instances, five were categorized as mechanism Type 1 (Discovery), six were mechanism Type 2 (Strategic), and four were mechanism Type 3 (Revisit). All of the observed instances fit into one of the three categories. As will be discussed in more detail below, it is noteworthy that only one-third of the instances were coded as Strategic (the only type that is arguably attributable to deviant behavior on the part of technology champions). The prevalence of Discovery and Revisit switchbacks suggests that nonlinearities are a natural (productive) part of the complex technology development process and should not be quashed by rigid management practices. The sections that follow describe each of the switchback mechanisms. The impact of their existence on technology management is discussed in Section V.
A. Mechanism Type 1
Switchbacks are a natural part of the process of developing complex systems. New technical gaps are discovered through systems integration, sparking later rounds of component R&D.
Complex technical systems are composed of hierarchically integrated components and subsystems, as illustrated in Fig. 2(a) . Each subsystem may itself be a complex system in its own right, composed of interacting components. As conceptualized by linear models of the innovation process (e.g., as embodied by a TRL scale), new concepts begin as component inventions and are progressively integrated into larger system elements as they mature [see Fig. 2(b) ]. While this model does capture the progression observed in some innovation pathways, most innovations are more "loopy" in their progression. As illustrated in Fig. 2(c) , the act of integrating an improved component #1.1 into subsystem #1 may change the conditions under which component #1.2 must perform. Depending on the extent of the change, an evolution of the capability embodied by component #1.2 may be required. As a result, the improved state of subsystem #1 may only be achieved once a second component1.2 focused research program is successful. In such an instance, an outside observer would see the following sequence: a component-level basic R&D effort, followed by subsystem integration, followed by a return to component-level basic R&D effort eventually leading to full subsystem integration. This will be perceived as a loss in maturity because from an aggregate perspective, it may not be apparent that the second component-level R&D is on a new component.
This switchback mechanism is common in practice. Consider an example observed in the development of TechC, which is a dedicated instrument cooling subsystem. The initiating insight in this case was that the incumbent single-shot system could be operated more efficiently if existing modules were recombined in sequence (a level N idea). Each module could then be operated in a temperature cascade, requiring less coolingpower per unit and enabling continuous operations. This approach worked well in simulation, but when the first prototype was constructed, it became apparent that a fundamentally new component technology would be required at the interface. Where the interface heat switch had previously operated passively (only being active when the system was being recycled), now in the continuous mode, it would need to have a new active function. This prompted a basic-research activity at the component level (level N-1). This looping through the discovery process is a natural progression of systems development. It was also observed as switchback B1, C4, D1, and E/F1 (see Tables I ).
B. Mechanism Type 2
Switchbacks are the result of a strategic framing used by technologists to survive funding shortfalls.
The second kind of switchback occurs when pathways face termination, often as a result of a funding shortfall. These can occur when agency/firm priorities shift or the team fails to win follow-on research grants. The switchback occurs as a byproduct of a strategy used by technology champions to survive these droughts. There are three parts to explaining the strategy: 1) why continuity is critical; 2) how the existence of hierarchical complexity creates an exercisable option; and 3) why the economics make the option worthwhile.
First, continuity is critical because of the human element of an innovation pathway. When funding is disrupted, key personnel are often reassigned to other projects; and tight schedules associated with project delivery typically limit a person's ability to return to R&D once funding is restored. The change in staff affects project success because the design knowledge associated with cutting edge research projects is largely tacit: It can't easily be transferred from one team member to his or her replacement. As a result, when critical personnel leave, in the best case, time is lost to enable relearning. This reality is well understood by NASA researchers, as described in the below quotes:
We were never concerned that the technical capability would become obsolete . . . [we were] worried about losing one key technician . . . who was the kind of guy who would rather retire and work on his motorcycle than transition to another project while waiting for funding to be restored. And rebuilding that kind of expertise would have taken a very long time . . . . We have had fits and starts 1) because of the money being erratic (for several years we have had midyear budget cuts that are really drastic . . . and then 2) you have to reduce your staff . . . and it is hard to build it back up again. An example is that we had this really good mechanical team working on the mirror [mounting . . . But he] got called off because we were low priority . . . [but] technology requires the right kind of person, and it just takes time to get that person up to speed . . . eventually we realized that we just had to get the right person, but it was really like two or three years that we made no appreciable progress on the mechanical mounting aspect.
As a result, maintaining at least baseline funding is critical to sustained development.
Second, the existence of hierarchical complexity creates an option that can be exercised to survive droughts. As alluded to in mechanism Type 1, subsystems at level N can either be improved through architectural ideas at level N, or through some combination of improvements at level N -1. Since there are rarely enough resources to pursue all paths simultaneously, innovation teams exercise discretion in choosing where to focus their efforts. Sometimes the choice is based on technical rationale or future mission priorities, other times the choice is strategic, as explained below.
The economics of R&D funding make some paths more likely to enable the sustained baseline funding that is required to support workforce continuity. R&D activities at level N are necessarily more expensive than equivalent activities at level N -1. Order of magnitude estimates for different levels of R&D activities are summarized in Fig. 3 . Within NASA, funding mechanisms tend to be grouped in terms of the level of the effort they support: tens of thousands for basic research, hundreds of thousands for applied research and millions for mission-oriented development. While resources are available at each level, the number of funding opportunities tends to scale inversely with funding level: for example, there are multiple sources of funding for basic research in any given year, while mission-oriented opportunities only come up once every few years. Fig. 3 illustrates how these drivers combine to cause strategic switchbacks. After progressing to subsystem-level development, if a funding drought seems imminent, teams can exploit the option by either focusing on maturing a key component, or finding a new system application to research. Both these activities are more readily fundable and serve to keep the team together. At the institutional level, this strategic regression appears as a loss in maturity, even though the activities often contribute indirectly to system-level progress.
Given the uncertainty associated with R&D funding in most organizations, this dynamic is prevalent too. Continuing the example from "TechC," the team ran into funding challenges five years into the development, when they would have liked to start testing their multistage prototype. Funding for crosscutting R&D had been reduced across the agency and there was no future mission that required the continuous capability. So, in order to keep the team together they proposed development activities on the control electronics (option 1: focusing on maturing key components as shown in Fig. 3 ) and developed new laboratory applications for the capability (option 2: finding a new system application to research). While these efforts were not directly related to maturity as measured at level N, they proved useful when new development opportunities arose. This mechanism was also observed in instances A1, A2, C3, D3, and E/F4, described in Table I .
C. Mechanism Type 3
Switchbacks mark a return to unfinished tasks when mission priorities shift.
In complex systems, there are almost always more technically viable and scientifically interesting improvement directions than there is funding available to pursue them at any given time. Pressure to meet delivery schedules, or to take advantage of mission opportunities as they come up, often leads to a large number of orphaned ideas-ideas that would have been pursued if there had been the time and budget. As a result of this reality, if the exogenous schedule pressure shifts, innovating teams often choose to re-visit the orphaned ideas. In the context of NASA, an exogenous schedule shift might result from a failed mission bid, a cancellation or a new related discovery. These later rounds of R&D [56] appear as regressions in maturity, since they tend to open new basic research projects at the component level, even when they contribute to performance at the system level.
This dynamic was clearly evident in the pathway of TechE-a revolutionary detector technology with several subcomponents. Initially, the main challenge was producing a prototype that worked. Facing an ominous deadline, time was spent on each subcomponent until some level of functionality was achieved and then the team immediately moved on to the next. The philosophy is well captured by the following quote regarding the absorber material: "We don't have any illusions that what is being used now is in any sense optimal. It's something that works." This strategy resulted in some key design tradeoffs that the team made note of in case there was an opportunity to revisit them. As described in detail in [56] , a sequence of mission-level failures created such an opportunity: asked to rebuild the system, the team was able to solve some key component challenges and drastically improve the performance of the system, twice. This revisit mechanism was also observed in instances B2, D2, and E/F3 described in Table I .
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR SYSTEMS ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT
The nonlinearity of the innovation process described above has implications for how R&D can and should be managed in an engineering organization. The previous section outlined three mechanisms through which switchbacks occur in complex integrated systems, and illustrated how prevalent they are in normal innovation pathways. This section focuses on how linear thinking about innovation/infusion interacts with the realities of the switchback phenomenon. It then examines the implications of those interactions for technology management.
A. How Linear Models of Innovation Manifest at the Working Level
Although few NASA engineers, scientists, or managers would admit to assuming a linear view of the innovation process, that way of thinking pervades the system. Heuristics that are grounded in a linear way of thinking were volunteered throughout the interviews that were conducted as part of this study. They ranged from strategic-level heuristics like: "x% of my funding should be dedicated to early stage concepts" and "y% of proposals should be selected for funding at each stage, to control the flow" to tactical-level heuristics like "proposers should graduate from IR&D within z years." Although this is not a paper about decision heuristics, their existence is at the core of understanding why the above-described mechanisms are practically important.
In order to enable a detailed discussion of why switchbacks matter for technology management, in the remainder of this discussion, the focus is on one tactical-level heuristic that illustrates both how embedded the thinking is and its impact on the process. The heuristic that we will focus on is "[technologists] shouldn't go back to the trough too many times." The "trough" in this context refers to Internal Research and Development (IR&D) (administered as center discretionary funds within NASA). The NASA instantiation of IR&D was originally conceived of as seed funding, designed to support the early-stage research necessary to bid for external money. Consistent with linear thinking, there is an expectation that innovators should "graduate from IR&D," and move on to NASA-level research activities or flight projects. In this context, cycling back, or proposing multiple sequential IR&Ds is seen as an inappropriate use of the mechanism. There is an implication that it is lazy or unproductive behavior. Importantly, there is no recognition that a return to IR&D can be an appropriate response, as governed by the above described switchback mechanisms.
B. How Linear-Based Heuristics Influence Behavior
This way of thinking influences the behavior of both technology managers and technologists interested in proposing research ideas. For managers, the concept of "returning too many times to the trough" factors qualitatively into resource allocation decisions. When discussing proposals, reviewers will note whether the proposer is a "frequent flyer," evidenced by comments like "wasn't [technologist X] funded for the same project last year" or "haven't we seen that name come up too often." While there is no explicit line-item on the scoring card for "number of submissions on the same topic," nor a quantitative measure of "too many" submissions in a several-year time frame, being noted as a frequent flyer will factor negatively into the evaluation regardless of the merit of the concept.
For technologists, the recognition of this perception influences how they choose where to propose their ideas. Technologists generally see IR&D as the most dependable source of funding, and one that can be secured with relatively limited administrative overhead (i.e., grant writing with detailed budgets). As such, many technologists are conscious of not being seen as over-proposing and thereby running the risk of cutting off a critical source of support. Since the concept of "over-proposing" is quite nebulous, different proposers have interpreted it differently. Everyone agrees that IR&D is an appropriate first-source of funding to work out a new concept. The disagreement is with regards to how else it should be used. Some technologists are careful to only propose concepts that are obviously different from one another. Others ensure multiyear gaps between proposals on similar topics. Still others only propose to IR&D when they are confident of a near-term infusion opportunity.
C. How These Behaviors Constrain Productive Paths
Each of these approaches biases the system in a different way. Only proposing concepts that are clearly different from one another is either a framing ruse, or serves to distract focus from promising ideas. The time from concept to infusion has been consistently measured as longer than a decade, often approaching two. Given that in reality, it is unlikely that particular technologists are efficiently pursuing tens of legitimately different concepts at any given time. This strategy would likely create many orphaned technologies rather than taking the time to shepherd the best ideas from concept to maturity. Thus, from an evaluator's perspective, seeing many different ideas from the same proposer is likely more of a "red flag," than would be seeing the same concept over and over again.
Similarly, enforcing an arbitrary spacing between proposals fails to account for the natural stochasticity of the process. The above-described switchbacks will occur at unpredictable intervals, manifesting as outcomes of uncertain technical discovery and political-level formulation processes. It is clearly inefficient to delay initiating a component-level research activity, purely to satisfy an artificial timing requirement. Faced with this situation, technologists may seek "underground" sources to satisfy the dual need for spacing between IR&Ds and for a new component-level research activity. For example, in the TechC pathway, when a key funding source was cut, rather than "going back to the (IR&D) trough" the lead technologist creatively strung together a number of alternative sources. He secured a trickle of funding from a project study as an informal quid pro quo for proposal and review work. He also became involved with some balloon and sounding rocket campaigns. Finally, he spent time on funded technology transfer. These efforts provided the funding necessary to keep the team together, but certainly distracted from progress on the core capability. Had the technologist not been so conscious of appropriate spacing between IR&D requests, more progress might have been made during that period.
Finally, only applying for IR&D resources when the path to infusion is clear, nearly defeats the purpose of IR&D as a seed funding mechanism. If the future flight application is near-term and clear, there are other mechanisms more suitable for the work. While it is important to encourage proposers to think through, and articulate, potential future infusion paths, potential is the key word in this concept. Not surprisingly, it is much easier to articulate the infusion path when it is already known, leading to an unfair advantage in funding competitions. TechA, TechC, TechE, and TechF all used IRAD strategically, to fill shortfalls late in their pathways once the target mission was already known. Given the value of these technologies, it would be inappropriate to label this use as completely negative but it is also important to recognize that strategic switchbacks steal from the early stage concepts that have no other funding options. This dynamic could be mitigated if gap-filling and early stage sources were better separated.
While this discussion has focused exclusively on switchbacks to IR&D (the earliest stage funding), the dynamics described apply equally to other levels of the system. Whether at the level of basic or applied research, the interaction of linear thinking and the need for natural switchbacks led to something of a selffulfilling prophecy: In an effort to quash what is perceived as lazy looping behavior, managers have induced an environment that encourages proposers to be more strategic in their use of mechanisms like IR&D. Thus, while many switchbacks are necessary, and natural parts of the innovation process, funding managers may be seeing a disproportionate number of strategic instances compared to discovery and revisit ones. This reinforces the perception that switchbacks are indicative of unproductive behavior, when actually they are often productive.
VI. CONCLUSION AND NEXT STEPS
This study examined an under-explored aspect of technology management-the critical role played by first-line managers in guiding the development of complex engineered products. In so doing it illustrated a misalignment between existing models of how the process should and does work. The discrepancy is explained in terms of three underlying switchback mechanisms. These constructs add an endogenous (to the technical system) theoretical explanation to the ongoing discussion of nonlinearities in the innovation process. From a practical perspective, understanding that switchbacks are not evidence of deviance that should be suppressed and why they occur provides a basis for improved technology management.
The path from concept to infusion takes time-rarely less than a decade. During that time, "switchbacks" are a common occurrence that can be explained in terms of three working-level mechanisms. First, in hierarchically integrated systems, the integration process often reveals additional component changes that require dedicated research efforts. Second, since the process often takes longer than the span of three sequential basic, applied and project-oriented grants, most cases experience a funding shortfall at some point. Since component development and architecture research each require less resources than architecture development, switching back to these lower maturity activities is often an intelligent way to survive the shortfall. Third, in a discrete mission-opportunity environment, there is a strong incentive to bid for missions as they arise. As a result, many of the identified improvement paths are never explored. If the mission bid is unsuccessful, it makes sense to revisit some of these unexplored paths.
These switchbacks are a natural part of the process and are not a dynamic that can, or should, be suppressed. The problem with linear model based management tools is that they lead to an emphasis on flow control rather than seeking to enable the natural dynamics articulated herein, as opportunities arise. This is true even when there is nominal flexibility in their application, as is the case at NASA. Based on the more nuanced understanding of the mechanisms that drive innovation in complex hierarchical systems, moving forward, the goal of process management should not be to enforce linearity in the process (e.g., by encouraging projects to graduate from IR&D) nor necessarily to shorten the path; rather, it should be to support natural technical evolutions, providing the opportunity to compete for funding when it is needed, in the way that makes the most sense. This is of course easier said than done and more work is required to provide specific guidance. In practice, it is difficult to distinguish between productive switchbacks and laziness. Fortunately, the mechanisms articulated in this paper provide a basis for developing those necessary criteria in the context of particular organizations. The first step is to recognize the need to distinguish between types of switchbacks. This may seem trivial, but acknowledging the need runs counter to a linear way of thinking that is deeply engrained. For example, when the results of this study were presented to NASA scientists and technologists, they invariably noted surprise (and comfort) that their experience had been normal. In the words of one respondent: "I'd always thought I had a particularly tough road . . . it is kind of comforting to know that my path was pretty normal." Embedding this new way of thinking-the understanding that switchbacks are normal and not deviant-is a matter of education. Recording and disseminating accounts of real innovation pathways can go a long way to shift expectations.
Once evaluators and proposers have accepted the reality of switchbacks, the challenge becomes one of distinguishing among types. If full information is revealed, there are identifiable differences between the three types of switchbacks, and distinguishing is straightforward. The current difficulty stems from the active deception (strategic framing) that is currently rampant. Future research should target strategies for removing the incentive to frame proposals strategically. Two possible approaches might include: removing distinctions between buckets, or creating more buckets that fall outside any reasonable sequence. In the first case, proposers might be less likely to pretend to be early stage if that did not disqualify them from most types of funding. In the latter case, the off sequence buckets might include gap-filler resources, explicitly helping keep teams together during a year of unanticipated funding shortfall, or resources allocated based on characteristics of the proposer rather than the technology. In either case, the challenge is in designing a system that is flexible enough to accommodate switchbacks, without completely losing accountability. This is a topic that merits significant further study.
